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LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW

During the period covered by this survey, most of the cases considered
by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals were actions arising under the National Labor Relations Act. In one of its more notable decisions, the Tenth
Circuit court ruled that appropriate bargaining units in the health care industry may no longer be determined by the National Labor Relations
Board's traditional community of interests test, but must be based upon the
disparity of interests between employee groups. This survey will discuss
twenty-six of the more significant and interesting cases decided by the court
of appeals.
I.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-LABOR MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS ACT 1

A. Jurisdction
The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (Board or
NLRB) was challenged on two grounds in R. W. Harmon & Sons, Inc. v.
NLRB. 2 Harmon, a provider of school bus transportation services to public
school districts in nine states, first claimed that its activities were essentially
local and did not affect interstate commerce. 3 Second, Harmon contended it
shared the school district's governmental exemption from NLRB jurisdiction.4 In asserting this claim, Harmon argued that it was prevented from
participating meaningfully in collective bargaining with its employees because the school district had authority to reject job applicants and recommend dismissal of Harmon's employees. 5 The Board rejected these
arguments and ordered a representation election, which was won by the
union. When Harmon refused to bargain, 6 the union filed charges and the
Board found Harmon in violation of subsections 8(a)(1) and 8a(5) of the
7
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act).
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-169, 171-188 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

2. 664 F.2d 248 (10th Cir. 1981).
3. Id. at 250. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) provides that: "The Board is empowered . . . to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce."
4. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1976) provides, intrr aha, that "any State or political subdivision
thereof," is not subject to the Board's jurisdiction.
5. 664 F.2d at 250. "Courts have interpreted section [152(2)] to prohibit the Board from
asserting jurisdiction over private employers that perform services for exempt governmental
entities if the employer does not 'retain sufficient control over the employment relationship to
engage in meaningful collective bargaining.'" Id. at 251 (citing Board of Trustees of Memorial

Hosp. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177, 185 (10th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Pope Maintenance Corp., 573
F.2d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 1978)).
6. An employer seeking judicial review of Board representation election decisions must

refuse to bargain with the union after the election in order to precipitate an unfair labor practice proceeding which will be reviewable in the federal courts. Magnesium Casting Co. v.
NLRB, 401 U.S. 137, 139 (1971). Se generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW,
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

43, 60 (1976).

7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1976). Section 158(a)(1) prohibits acts of interference, re-
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On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Harmon's contention that the essentially local nature of its business precluded Board jurisdiction was rejected.
The court pointed out that the Board's jurisdiction encompasses even a local
business if interstate commerce is affected. 8 With respect to Harmon's second argument that it lacked sufficient control over the employment relationship to bargain meaningfully, the court ruled that Harmon's control over
wages and benefits was sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional test. 9 An employer is not required "to control all terms and conditions of employment,
but only enough . . . to bargain effectively."' 0 The court, therefore, enforced the Board's order.
Harmon also argued that the Board abused its discretion by abandoning part of its earlier jurisdictional test for school bus operators without
following the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.1 1
Prior to National Transportation Services, Inc. ,12 the Board refused to exercise
jurisdiction over private school bus transportation companies because they
were intimately connected with a statutorily exempt governmental unit. In
National Transportation, however, the Board rejected the "intimately connected" test and decided to assert jurisdiction over school bus companies so
long as they retain sufficient control over employment conditions to bargain
meaningfully. 13 The Tenth Circuit court refused to address this issue of in4
formal rulemaking because it had not been raised in the court below.'
B.

Federal Preemptionand Exclusivity of Remedies

One issue considered by the Tenth Circuit court in Peabody Ga/ion v. Dollar15 was whether an Oklahoma statute 16 prohibiting discharge of employees
for filing workers' compensation claims was preempted by the NLRA. The
collective bargaining agreement between the company and the union provided that employees who became disabled due to an occupational injury or
illness could be placed on workmen's compensation leave until suitable lowrisk jobs became available. Pursuant to this provision, thirty-four employees
who had filed workers' compensation claims were laid off in a two-month
period because Peabody claimed no suitable positions were vacant. The employees felt they were, in effect, wrongfully discharged and filed grievances
straint, or coercion by an employer with the rights of employees (guaranteed in § 157) to organize, form, join, or assist a labor organization, to bargain collectively, or to refrain from any of
these activities. Section 158(a)(5) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees.
8. 664 F.2d at 250.
9. Id. at 251.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 251-52. The Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking provision is codified at 5
•U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
12. 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
13. Id. at 566.
14. 664 F.2d at 252. The Board's reluctance to use formal rulemaking procedures has been
criticized, but its policy of announcing rules in adjudicatory proceedings has been upheld.
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759
(1969). See generaly Bernstein, The NLRB's Adj)dication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Admnzztrative
Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970).
15. 666 F.2d 1309 (10th Cir. 1981).
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 5-7 (Supp. 1980).
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seeking binding arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. Two
cases reaching arbitration resulted in awards for the company, so the employees filed a diversity action in federal court seeking a remedy under
Oklahoma law. The trial court rejected Peabody's contention that the statutory cause of action was barred by federal labor policy and denied its motion
for summary judgment.17
On interlocutory appeal, the Tenth Circuit court asserted that "the preemption doctrine is not turned on by simply shouting preemption or by
pressing a button." 18 The court noted the following two rationales that apply to the invocation of the preemption doctrine: the supremacy clause and
the theory of primary jurisdiction. t9 According to the court in Peabody, these
rationales have been utilized in the formulation of three preemption tests in
the area of labor relations. The first of these tests, enunciated in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Carton,20 requires preemption of state regulation
when the activity regulated is protected by section 721 or prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA. 22 When the activity is only arguably subject to those
sections "the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive
competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state
interference with national policy is to be averted." ' 23 Supplementing Carnon,
the second test, based on the supremacy clause, requires that where the activity is not arguably subject to the NLRA, preemption may still be justified
if "the absence of federal regulation is indicative of a congressional determination to leave the challenged conduct available" and if state regulation
would upset "the balance of power between labor and management expressed in national labor policy." '2 4 The third test, known as the frustration
test, demands preemption of a state law if it would frustrate the Act's effec25
tive implementation.
In applying the Carton test, the appellate court in Peabody determined
that discharging employees for claiming workers' compensation was not conduct subject to the Act since it was not related in any way to union organization or collective bargaining. 26 Furthermore, the activity provoking the
disputed discharges did not have a tendency to conflict with federal labor
17. 666 F.2d at 1312.
18. Id. at 1314.
19. Id.
The supremacy clause focuses on the extent to which Congress has occupied the field
of labor relations by extending protection to certain conduct. The primary jurisdiction theory requires preemption where the conduct at issue is subject to the unfair
labor practice jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 198-200 (1978)).
20. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides that employees have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively, to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and to
refrain from any or all of such activities.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976) prohibits certain unfair labor practices of employers and labor
organizations, including interference with § 157 rights.
23. Peabody, 666 F.2d at 1314.
24. Id. at 1315 (citing Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964)).
25. 666 F.2d at 1315 (citing The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARv. L. REV. 60,270 & n.46

(1979)).
26. 666 F.2d at 1316. The court futher noted that the Garmon test does not require preemp-
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law.2 7 Regarding the second test, the court concluded that preemption was
not justified because the absence of federal regulation did not indicate a
congressional intention to leave the challenged conduct available; Congress
2
The
has never considered workers' compensation related discharges.
Peabody court also noted that permitting state regulation in the area would
not upset the balance of power between labor and management because the
29
objective of such regulation is unrelated to the goals of organized labor.
The frustration test also failed to convince the court that the preemption
doctrine should be applied. Since workers' compensation is primarily a state
concern, "enforcement of the Oklahoma statute does not create any hazard
' 30
Moreover, the statute
of interference with federally protected activity."
applies to all Oklahoma employees, not just unin members, and hence, it is
more difficult to find a congressional intent to preempt than if it applied
31
specifically to concerted union activity.
Finally, the court reasoned that even if the Oklahoma statute did not
withstand the preemption tests, it would nevertheless qualify as a "state con32
Therefore, the Tenth Circern" exception to the preemption requirement.
cuit court upheld the trial court's assertion of jurisdiction.
Another issue considered in Peabody was whether the binding arbitration
provision in the collective bargaining agreement precluded the employees
Peabody maintained that even if the
from seeking other remedies.
Oklahoma statute was not preempted by federal labor law, the employees
did not have a statutory cause of action because arbitration was the exclusive
remedy for disputes arising under the collective bargaining agreement. The
court of appeals agreed that the issue of whether Peabody's conduct violated
the agreement's guidelines for placing workers on workers' compensation
leave was arbitrable.33 However, the dispute over Peabody's motive for placing the workers on leave was not arbitrable because it arose under the
34
Since one
Oklahoma statute, not the collective bargaining agreement.
"cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute which he did not contract to
arbitrate,"3 5 the court found the exclusivity rule inapplicable.
A significant aspect of the Peabody opinion was the court's recognition
that federal policy favors binding arbitration, but that important exceptions
apply to its exclusivity as a remedy. One of these exceptions, reviewed by
the Peabody court, arose in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo. 36 and was extended
in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc..37 In Gardner-Denver the
tion where only a minor aspect of the controversy is arguably within the Board's jurisdiction.
Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1316-17.
30. Id. at 1317.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1320.
35. Id.
36. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
37. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
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Supreme Court ruled that arbitration did not provide an adequate remedy
for enforcement of Title VII38 rights and, thus, the statutory right to trial
could not be precluded by the initiation of arbitration procedures. 39 The
Court expanded this ruling in Barrentine to include substantive rights arising
under the Fair Labor Standards Act,4° reasoning that such rights were individual, not collective. 4 1 Applying the Supreme Court's rationale in GardnerDenver and Barrentine, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Peabody acknowledged that the alternative remedy arose under state rather than federal law, but held that such difference did not constitute a distinguishing
factor.42 Accordingly, the court rejected Peabody's claim that the arbitration remedy barred the statutory action.
C. Interference With Employee Rights
Husky Oil, NP.R. Operations,Inc. v. NLRB 4 3 dealt with the question of an

employer's right under the NLRA to deny non-employee union organizers
access to a worksite for the purpose of encouraging employees to vote for
union representation. Husky refused to give the union permission to visit
personally its remote Alaskan worksite, and the union filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Board. The company contended that other reasonable means of communicating with the employees were available to the
union. The Board rejected this contention and ordered Husky to allow the
44
union to visit the worksite.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit applied NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. ,45
which held that nonemployee union organizers may be excluded from company property if two conditions are met. First, other means of communication must be available which permit the union, through reasonable efforts, to
reach the employees. 46 Second, the no-access rule must not be applied discriminatorily against the union. 4 7 Relying on the Third Circuit's interpretation of Babcock in NLRB v. Tamiment, Inc. ,48 Husky maintained that the
Board erred in evaluating the available channels of communication when
the union had not shown that it made reasonable efforts to reach the employees. The Tenth Circuit court declined to follow the Third Circuit, declaring that the Board could evaluate the available channels without the
union first having demonstrated its efforts to communicate with the
employees.

49

The court affirmed the importance of face-to-face contact between
38. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976) &
Supp. IV 1980).
39. 415 U.S. at 51-52.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
41.

450 U.S. at 737-44.

42. 666 F.2d at 1321.
43.

669 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1982).

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 645.
351 U.S. 105 (1956).
Id. at 112.
Id.
451 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1012 (1972).
669 F.2d at 645.
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union representatives and Husky employees, observing that such contact was
possible only at the Anchorage airport or at the employee's homes when they
were periodically on leave. 50 Finding substantial evidence on the record to
support the Board's conclusion that these and other means of contact were
unsatisfactory, the court of appeals enforced the Board's order. 5 ' Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit did so with some reluctance, remarking that "this is a
close case, especially because the employer was willing to give the union the
' 52
names, home addresses, and telephone numbers of the employees."
In an unpublished opinion, Frank Paxton Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 5 3 the
Tenth Circuit court reviewed a Board finding that Paxton had violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act 54 by discharging Kirk for engaging in concerted activities protected by section 7 of the Act. 55 The company argued that
Crownover, the manager who actually terminated Kirk, was not motivated
by animus but by Kirk's excessive absenteeism and his failure to report his
absences in a timely fashion after being warned that such conduct would no
longer be tolerated. 56 Accepting the Board's finding that Sanchez, Kirk's
immediate supervisor, had lied to Crownover about giving the warning, the
court held that "even if the person actually making the termination decision
acted in good faith, [section] 8(a)(1) is violated if the decision was based on
'5 7
conduct by a discriminatorily motivated supervisor."
Paxton maintained that Sanchez's failure to give the warning could not
have been discriminatorily motivated since Sanchez's neglect and subsequent lie occurred before he knew of Kirk's concerted activity.58 The Board,
however, found that prior to Sanchez's neglected warning, Kirk and other
employees had begun discussing various job related safety problems and the
lack of meaningful job classifications, and that Kirk had suggested to
Sanchez that operations would be improved by assigning specific job duties
to specific employees. 59 Curiously, the court suggested this was not concerted activity because it "was not clearly shown to have been a presentation
of a group viewpoint, although it concerned all the employees of the warehouse .. ."60 Nevertheless, the court found other support in the record for
the Board's conclusion that the discharge was discriminatorily motivated
6
and, therefore, enforced the order. '
50. Id. at 647.
51. Id. at 648.

52. Id.
53.
54.
55.
general
56.
57.

No. 78-1607 (10th Cir. June 29, 1981).
See supra note 7.
See supra note 21. The NLRA does not define the term "concerted activity," but for a
discussion of case law in this area, see R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 296-325.
No. 78-1607, slip op. at 9.
Id. at 11 (citing Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 312 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.

1962)).
58. No. 78-1607, slip op. at 9.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. at 11. The statement that Kirk and other employees had been "discussing among
themselves . . . the lack of meaningful job classifications," id. at 3, would seem to suggest that
Kirk was indeed presenting "a group viewpoint."
61. Id. at 11-12. The Tenth Circuit supported its holding, inter a/ia, by noting that Kirk
did engage in protected concerted activity after Sanchez's neglected warning and Kirk was
discharged shortly thereafter. Id.
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NLRB v. American Can Co. 62 arose from an NLRB order holding that
application of a superseniority clause 63 to a union guard and trustee violated
the NLRA by interfering with the rights of other employees and by encouraging participation in union activities. 64 The company decided to cease operations, and among the employees retained or recalled to assist in closing
the plant were Schneider, a union guard, and Howard, a union trustee.
These union officers were given preference over more senior employees solely
due to the application of the superseniority clause. Charges were filed with
the Board against the union and the employer by two former employees of
the defunct company.
The Tenth Circuit court analyzed the application of the superseniority
clause in the light of Supreme Court standards set forth in NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc. 65 Under Great Dane, an action which encourages or discourages union membership or activity is unlawful without proof of antiunion motivation, if it is inherently destructive of important employee
rights. 66 When the adverse impact on these important employee rights is,
however, comparatively slight, then proof of anti-union motivation is required if the employer has come forward with evidence that the conduct was
motivated by legitimate and substantial business considerations. 67 The
Tenth Circuit court held the superseniority clause was not inherently destructive of important employee rights, but did to some extent have an adverse impact on those rights. Thus, there was a burden on the employer and
union to come forward with evidence of legitimate and substantial business
justifications. 68 Since no justification was established, the appellate court
affirmed the Board's conclusion that the superseniority clause violated the
69
Act.
The court in American Can also observed that Board decisions have held
superseniority clauses are presumptively valid if they do not go beyond layoff
and recall of union stewards. 70 This presumption rests on the belief that the
steward's key role in the grievance procedure requires their continued presence on the job. 7 1 The court did not pass directly on this presumption. The
62. 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981).
63. The clause in the collective bargaining agreement provided that up to 10 union officers
would have preference in case of layoff or recall, regardless of their seniority. Id. at 749. Concerning superseniority, see generally Note, Superseniort'y: Post-DairyleaDevelopments, 29 CASE
W. RES. 499 (1979); Note, Superseniority: Latitudes and Limitations, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 832 (1980).
64. The Board charged the union with violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), (b)(2) (1976)
which provide, inter alia, that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to
interfere with employees' rights to refrain from union activities or to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee in an attempt to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. In addition, the employer was charged with violation of 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1), (3) (1976). Section 158(a)(1) is summarized in supra note 7. Section 158(a)(3) provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in hiring, tenure,
or any other condition of employment in order to encourage or discourage union membership.
65. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
66. Id. at 34.
67. Id.
68. Amenan Can, 658 F.2d at 756-57.
69. Id. at 757.
70. Id. at 755.
71. Id See generally Note, Untion Steward Sapersent'rit, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1
(1976).
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Tenth Circuit court did, however, agree with the Board's holding that superseniority for union officers other than stewards requires the union to prove
that such officers have "duties which relate directly to the effective and efficient functioning of the bargaining unit."' 72 The exact proof needed depends on the circumstances and should be left to the NLRB, but the court
suggested as a minimum requirement that the union officer receiving superseniority benefits should be one who "help[s] to implement the collective
73
bargaining agreement in a meaningful way."
The Tenth Circuit court in NLRB v. Wilhow Corp.74 considered the appropriateness of a Board bargaining order 75 as a remedy for an employer's
refusal to bargain when notified of majority union support 76 and the employer's subsequent unfair labor practices. The court agreed that Wilhow
violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act 7 7 by interrogating employees about the
attempted unionizing 78 and also found substantial evidentiary support for
the determination that section 8(a)(3)79 was violated by discriminatory discharge of two union supporters.8 0 Conceding that the employer's evidence
of a nondiscriminatory motive for the firings shifted the burden of proof to
the Board, the court of appeals nevertheless held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to meet that burden where "the record in its entirety allows a fair inference of discriminatory motivation." 8'
Accepting the administrative law judge's determination that prior to
the unfair labor practices a majority of the Wilhow employees supported the
union, the court proceeded to consider the propriety of the bargaining order
under the guidelines of NLRB v.Gissel Packing Co. ,82 the leading Supreme
Court decision on the issue. The Gzssel Court held that the Board could use
a bargaining order if the union at one point had majority support and the
employer's unfair practices made a fair election unlikely if only the traditional remedies were used.8 3 The court in Whow upheld the Board's bargaining order because of the following factors: the smallness of the plant, the
employer's inflexible attitude toward bargaining, and the residual effect of
terminations due to union activity. 84 Wilhow claimed that the rights of its
72. 658 F.2d at 757.
73.

Id.

74. 666 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1981).
75. The Supreme Court has affirmed the authority of the Board to go beyond the statutory
cease-and-desist order and require the employer to bargain with a union as a remedy for unfair
labor practices. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). See generally Lankford,
Nonmajorty Bargaining Orders: A Study in lndeciston, 46 ALB. L. REv. 363 (1982); Wortman &
Jones, Remedial Actions of the ?'LRB in Representation Cases: An Analysis of the Gissel Bargaining

Order, 30 LAB. L.J. 281 (1979).
76. Out of 17 eligible employees, 12 signed cards authorizing the union to represent them
for purposes of collective bargaining. 666 F.2d at 1298-99.
77. See supra note 7.

78. 666 F.2d at 1300 (interrogations found to be coercive, threatening, and a restraint on
unionizing activity).
79. See supra note 64.
80. 666 F.2d at 1301.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
395 U.S. 575 (1969).
Id. at 614.
666 F.2d at 1305.
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current employees would be violated by a bargaining order since only one of
the twelve employees who signed authorization cards was still employed.
The court, however, rejected this argument stating that employee turnover
does not justify withholding a bargaining order since "the validity of such an
order depends on evaluating the situation as of the time of the unfair labor
'8 5
practices."
At issue in NLRB v. Carbonex Coal Co. 86 was whether the company had a
duty to bargain over certain unilateral actions following a representation
election that the union won. 8 7 In a three-week period immediately after the
election, the company laid off eighteen employees and subcontracted its
truck hauling operations. Carbonex contended that these actions were necessitated by economic conditions88 and that it had no legal duty to bargain
with the union concerning these decisions since they had occurred before the
union's certification by the Board. 89
Even if the actions were motivated by economic conditions, the Tenth
Circuit court concluded that the company, nevertheless, had a duty to notify
the union before making changes so the union could have a meaningful op9°
Relying on
portunity to suggest alternatives and make counter-arguments.
92
9
King Radio Corp. v. NLRB ' and cases from other circuits, the court stated:
"It is well settled that unilateral action affecting working conditions taken by
an employer following a union victory at a representation election violates
section 8(a)(5), even if such unilateral action occurs prior to the union's certi93
fication as the collective bargaining agent."
In addition to making unilateral changes in working conditions, the
company also discharged three employees for refusing to cross a picket line
during a strike. Carbonex maintained that the discharges did not violate the
Act because the strike was unlawful. The court, however, found substantial
support for the NLRB's determination that the strike was a lawful unfair
labor practice strike and, therefore, the discharges violated the employees
rights. 94
The court of appeals also declined to follow the company's suggestion
that the case should be re-evaluated under the NLRB's new standard set
forth in Wright Line. 95 First, the court refused to apply a new test to a case
85. Id. at 1304 (citing Highland Plastics, Inc., 256 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (1981)).
86. 679 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1982).
87. The Board also found that the company had committed numerous unfair labor practicesprtor to the election, but these findings were not challenged on appeal. Id. at 202.
88. Id. at 203.
89. Id. at 205. After an election is held the Board evaluates any challenges to the validity
of the election. If these challenges are found to be groundless, the Board certifies the results of
the election. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (1976). See also R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 46-49.
90. 679 F.2d at 204.
91. 398 F.2d 14 (10th Cir. 1968).
92. Accord NLRB v. Allied Prod. Corp., 629 F.2d 1167, 1171 (6th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
McCann Steel Co., 448 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse
Co., 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966).
93. 679 F.2d at 205.
94. Id. at 204.
95. 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (lst Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
989 (1982). The Wright Line standard for allocating the burden of proof involves dual motive
discharges in which an employer arguably has both an illegal and a legitimate business reason
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decided by the NLRB prior to the change, but heard on appeal after the
change.9 6 Second, the Carbonex case, unlike Wright Litne, did not involve a
dual motive for the discharge since the Board found Carbonex's claim of9 7a
legitimate business motive to be not only pretextual, but also fabricated.
D.

Appropriate Bargaining Units

In Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB 98 the Tenth Circuit
court announced an important decision affecting the health care industry.
The case resulted from a medical center challenge of the appropriateness of a
bargaining unit 99 limited to registered nurses at one facility. The medical
center claimed that the bargaining unit should include all professionals, except physicians, at all three of its facilities. The appeal was based on the
Center's allegation that the Board had refused to consider the congressional
admonition that "[d]ue consideration should be given by the Board to
00
preventing proliferation of bargaining units in the health care industry."'
This warning was issued during the passage of the 1974 Health Care
Amendments010 which brought non-profit hospitals under the coverage of
the NLRA.
The Tenth Circuit relied on the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in
deciding that the NLRB's determination of the bargaining unit's scope and
02
In regard
composition was not in conformity with the intent of Congress. '
to unit scope, the Board has continued to apply a rebuttable presumption
that single facility units are appropriate. The Board defends this presumption by arguing that the congressional admonition is concerned only with
for the discharge of one of its employees. Once the general counsel for the Board has established
a prima facie case that protected conduct was a motivating or substantial factor in the discharge, the burden of production shifts to the employer to show that the discharge would have
occurred in the absence of the protected conduct. See generally Note, Wright Line: The NLRB
Adopts the Mt. Healthy Test for Dual Motive Discharge Cases Under the LMRA, 32 MERCER L. REV.
933 (1981).
96. 679 F.2d at 203.
97. Id. at 204. Although declining to apply the Wright Line rule, the court suggested that
there may be problems with the Board's new rule. Id. at 203. See also Lewis & Fisher, Wright
Line-An End to the Kaleidoscope in Dual Motive Cases?, 48 TENN. L. REV. 879 (1981).
98. 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981), modified, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976) provides that "the Board shall decide in each case whether,
in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining .... "
100. 653 F.2d at 453 (quoting S. CON. REP. No. 988, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3946, 3950).
101. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). See
generally Note, The 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act.- Jurisdictional
Standards and Appropriate Bargaining Units, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 351 (1977); Comment, Labor
Relations in the Health Care Indust.-the Impact ofthe 1974 Health Care Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, 54 TUL. L. REV. 416 (1980).
. 102. 653 F.2d at 455 (quoting NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir.
1978)); St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1977); 653 F.2d at 457 (quoting
Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980)); NLRB v. St. Francis
Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 419 (9th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of congressional intent concerning
health care institution bargaining units, see Bumpass, Appropriate Bargaining Units in Health Care
lnstiutions." An Analysis of Congressional Intent and Its Implementation by the National Labor Relations
Board, 20 B.C.L. REV.867 (1979).
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unit composition within a particular facility, not with whether a unit's scope
should include one facility or several.' 0 3 Although concurring with the
Board's literal reading of the legislative history, the court nevertheless perceived strong congressional concern for reducing unit fragmentation regardless of whether the source be from composition or scope. 10 4 Therefore, the
court held that the Board's "traditional factors used in scope determinations
'must be put in balance against the public interest in preventing fragmentation in the health care field.' "105 Moreover, the Board must specify "'the
manner in which its unit determination[s] . . .implement[] or reflect[] that
admonition.' "106
In regard to unit composition, the NLRB's ruling that a unit restricted
to registered nurses is presumptively appropriate was rejected by the court
for two reasons. First, because the rebuttable presumption shifted both the
burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion, the court reasoned that it violated Federal Rule of Evidence 301107 and impermissibly
relieved the Board of the burden to prove the occurrence of an unfair labor
practice by a preponderance of the evidence. 108 Second, the court held that
any use of a presumption which requires health care industry employers to
produce evidence of the inappropriateness of a limited bargaining unit is
contrary to the congressional admonition against proliferation of bargaining
units. 109
The Tenth Circuit court agreed with the Ninth Circuit court that to
give effect to the congressional intent requires the Board to "focus on the
'disparity of interests between employee groups which would prohibit or inhibit fair representation of employee interests.' "'1o In other words, appropriate unit determinations in the health care industry should no longer be
based on the Board's traditional community of interests test.1 I Instead,
focusing on the disparity of interests requires determining whether the inter103. 653 F.2d at 454 (citing Memorial Medical, 230 N.L.R.B. 976, 978 n.5 (1977)). See
generally Zimmerman, Trendr in NLRB Health Care IndustV Decistons, 32 LAB. L.J. 3 (1981).
104. 653 F.2d at 455.
105. Id. (quoting St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592 (3d Cir. 1977)).
106. 653 F.2d at 455 (quoting NLRB v. West Suburban Hosp., 570 F.2d 213, 216 (7th Cir.
1978)).
107. This reasoning was modified in Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.
1982). "On the question of which unit is appropriate for bargaining purposes, the NLRB has
no burden of persuasion that might be shifted by use of a presumption." Id. at 699. Rather
than a burden of persuasion, the court held that the NLRB relies on its expertise and experience
in making such determinations. Id. Furthermore, the court stated, "in the face of congressional
silence, we do not infer that Congress intended the NLRB to follow the Federal Rules of Evidence at the informal, nonadversarial representation proceedings." Id. at 700.
108. 653 F.2d at 456. Note, however, that this was modified in Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB,
688 F.2d 697, 700 (10th Cir. 1982), which held that in unfair labor practice proceedings, the
NLRB's general counsel does not have to prove that the unit chosen at the representation hearing was appropriate by a preponderance of the evidence.
109. 653 F.2d at 457.
110. Id. (quoting NLRB v. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d 404, 419 (9th Cir. 1979)). For an
examination of the St. Francis Hospital case, see Note, Registered Nurse Bargaining Units: Undue
Proiferatzon?, 45 Mo. L. REv. 348 (1980).
111. Under the community of interests test, the Board considers such factors as similarity of
earnings, benefits, hours, training, qualifications, and kind of work performed; also important
are contact among employees, common supervision, bargaining history, employee preference,
and extent of union organization. R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 69.
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ests of the registered nurses are sufficiently different from other professionals
to justify a separate unit. Applying this approach, the court ruled that an all
professional unit without physicians was an appropriate unit and remanded
12
the case to the Board for reconsideration.'
The Tenth Circuit also expressed its disagreement with the Board's position that the community of interests and disparity of interests tests are essentially the same.'" 3 According to the court, the Board should start with a
broad unit and eliminate employees with disparate interests, rather than be1 14
gin with a narrow unit and add employees with similar interests.
The differences between the respective tests espoused by the NLRB and
the Tenth Circuit court appear to be primarily a question of semantics. In
applying its community of interests test, the Board attempts to identify a
group which neither includes employees with significant conflicting economic interests nor excludes employees with common economic interests. 115
Whether the Board begins with a narrow unit and adds employees or begins
with a broad unit and deletes employees, the result should be approximately
the same."t 6 The court's approach favors the larger of two possible units
and gives controlling significance to the public interest in non-proliferation
of units. This is more than Congress was willing to do and gives the appearance of usurping the function of the Board. Perhaps a better approach
would be to require employees in a proposed limited unit to possess a greater
degree of community of interest when the unit is composed of health care
employees. 117
Following its holding in Presbyterian/St.Luke's Medical Center, the court
denied enforcement of Board'orders in two other cases with similar facts. In
Beth IsraelHospitaland Geriatric Center v. NLRB" 8t the Board approved a bargaining unit limited to registered nurses employed at only one of the employer's facilities. Beth Israel urged that a unit including all professionals
with whom the registered nurses worked would be more appropriate in view
of the congressional mandate to avoid undue proliferation of bargaining
units in the health care industry. The court decreed that a unit limited to
registered nurses should no longer be considered presumptively appropriate" 9 and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In St. Anthony Hospital Systems . NLRB' 2 ° the primary issue was again
whether the Board erred in approving a bargaining unit composed exclu112. 653 F.2d at 456.
113. Id. at 457-58 n.6. The Board's position was announced in Newton-Wellesley Hosp.,
250 N.L.R.B. 409 (1980).
114. 653 F.2d at 457-58 n.6.
115. See R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 69.
116. It is often possible that the factors considered in determining a community of interest
point to several units, any one of which could be an appropriate unit. See Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 825 (1964); see generall, Note, Appropriate Bargaining Units in Non-Profit Hospitals, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1221 (1980).
117. See Allegheny General Hosp., 239 N.L.R.B. 872, 884 (1978) (Penello, M., dissenting),
enforcement denied, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979).
118. 677 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1981), modifed, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1982).
119. 677 F.2d at 1345.
120. 655 F.2d 1028 (10th Cir. 1981), modified, 688 F.2d 697 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 433 (1982).
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sively of all nonsupervisory registered nurses at one of two facilities. Finding
the case identical to Presbyterian/St. Luke's, the Tenth Circuit court ruled that
the Board's application of a rebuttable presumption that the nurse unit was
appropriate improperly relieved the NLRB's general counsel of the burden
of proving the occurrence of an unfair labor practice. Thus, the Board's
order was unenforceable and the case was remanded for further
proceedings.12'
Crane Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB' 22 presented the issue of whether two
employers had delegated apparent authority to a multi-employer bargaining
unit1 2 3 for purposes of negotiating a binding agreement. The Tenth Circuit
court applied the Board test for determining apparent authority. This test
considers whether an employer clearly indicated an intention to be bound by
group action, whether the union had notice of the group's existence and the
delegation of bargaining authority to it, and whether the union agreed 1to
24
and actually began negotiations with the representative of the group.
Agreeing with the Board that the last two elements of the test were satisfied,
the appellate court nevertheless failed to find evidence on the record to indicate the employer intended to be bound by group action. 25 Despite association bylaws granting full authority to bind members, 126 the union was aware
that at the time the two employers joined the association, they retained the
right to disapprove any negotiated contract. 27 Stressing the clear evidence
of an intention not to be bound, the court rejected the Board's apparent
conclusion that the payment of membership fees to the association should be
determinative of the employers' intent.' 28 Consequently, the court in Crane
Sheet Metal held that the contract was not binding on the two employers.
After negotiations have begun, withdrawal from a multi-employer unit
is not permitted without consent of the opposing party unless unusual circumstances prevail. 129 Extreme financial hardship threatening the company's existence is one situation constituting an unusual circumstance.13 0 In
NLRB v. Custom Sheet Metal &Service Co. ,13' the court reviewed a Board determination that the threatened loss of the company's major customer did
not justify withdrawal from a multi-employer bargaining unit. Disagreeing
with the Board, the appellate court ruled that the threat of immediate loss of
a customer purchasing three-fourths of the company's production and the
121. Id. at 1031. For modifications of this decision, see supra notes 107 and 108.
122. 675 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1982).
123. A multi-employer bargaining unit exists where several employers within a single industry or area join together to bargain as a gro up wih a union representing employees at all of the
companies. Although the NLRA does not specifically authorize multi-employer units, the
Supreme Court has concluded that the practice has congressional approval. NLRB v. Truck

Drivers
124.
125.
126.
Id.

Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
675 F.2d at 259.
Id.
The employers were not aware of the bylaws until after the contract had been signed.

127. Id. at 258.
128. Id. at 259 n.9.
129. NLRB v. Tulsa Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 367 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1966); Retail Assoc.,

Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388 (1958).
130. Spun-Jee Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 557 (1968).
131. 666 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1981).
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actual loss of several smaller customers did jeopardize Custom Sheet Metal's
very existence.' 3 2 The court also emphasized that the employer's with33
drawal was apparently motivated solely by economic considerations.1
In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit in Harding Glass Industries
v. NLRB 134 ruled that an impasse 1 35 in negotiations, by itself, is not an unusual circumstance justifying withdrawal by an employer from a multi-employer bargaining unit.' 36 After numerous negotiating sessions had failed to
produce an agreement, a union representative ended one session by angrily
suggesting that Harding Glass was preventing agreement and that separate
negotiations with that company might be better. At the next meeting, Harding withdrew because of the alleged impasse and the union's suggestion of
separate negotiations. This attempted withdrawal was not consented to by
the union and the court held that the angry remarks made at a bargaining
session, and later modified, did not constitute consent; the court further held
that these remarks could not be treated as a binding offer, even if accepted
37
before withdrawn.'
In the absence of consent, Harding's withdrawal could be permitted
only if unusual circumstances were present.' 3 8 The appellate court carefully
considered the decisions of other circuits 139 holding that impasse alone constitutes an unusual circumstance justifying withdrawal. The court in Harding
Glass, however, declared that the better view is that withdrawal on impasse
should be prohibited so long as continued membership would not be unfair
because of other circumstances.140 Agreeing with recent First and Fifth Circuit opinions, 14 1 the Tenth Circuit court noted that most of the concerns
labelled by other courts as being connected with impasse are actually related
to the issues of separate contracts and selective strikes.142 Therefore, impasse
alone should not trigger the right to withdraw especially since an impasse
may be intentionally created by a party eager to withdraw. The court in
Harding Glass also stated that insisting on continued participation after impasse is not futile because changed circumstances may result in eventual
132. Id. at 458.
133. Id. at 459.
134. 672 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1982).

135. An impasse, or deadlock, exists when the parties no longer have any prospects of reach-

ing an agreement and further discussion would be unproductive. See R. GORMAN, supra note 6,
at 448.

136. 672 F.2d at 1335.
137. Id. at 1334.

138. Id.
139. H & D, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 139 (9th Cir. 1980) (withdrawn from publication);
NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1130 (1979); NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1975); Fairmont Foods
Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170 (8th Cir. 1972).
140. 672 F.2d at 1335.
141. NLRB v. Marine Machine Works, Inc., 635 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Charles
D. Bonanno Linen Serv., Inc., 630 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1980), afl'd, 454 U.S. 404 (1982). While
relying on the First Circuit court's decision in Bonnano, the court in HardingGlass held publication of its opinion in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's ruling in Bonanno. After the
Supreme Court in Bonanno held that impasse did not justify withdrawal in support of the decision in Hardng Class, the Tenth Circuit court published its opinion. 672 F.2d at 1339-40 n.4.
142. Id. at 1336.
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agreement.1 43 Accordingly, the court upheld the Board's finding that Harby the
ding committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to be bound
144
collective bargaining agreement negotiated after it withdrew.
The court also weighed a related issue arising from the remedy provided
by the Board. Harding argued that the economic strike that was in progress
at the time it withdrew from the bargaining unit did not become an unfair
labor practice strike' 45 merely because the withdrawal violated the NLRA.
Therefore, Harding maintained, the strikers were not entitled to the Board's
remedy of reinstatement and backpay because permanent replacements had
been hired.146 In upholding the Board's remedy, the court found that Harding's unlawful refusal to bargain became at least as important to the strikers as their effort to obtain economic goals. Therefore, the court in Hardng
Glass held that the Board could reasonably conclude that the refusal to bargain became a motivation for the strike,147 thus converting the economic
strike into an unfair labor practice strike and entitling the strikers to rein148
statement and back pay.
E.

Representation Elections. Conduct and Review

The employer in Crown Cork &Seal Co. v. NLRB' 49 asserted it did not
have to bargain with the newly certified union because of improper conduct
surrounding the election.' 50 Noting that public policy favors exparte resolution of election objections, 15 the court of appeals rejected the employer's
demand for an evidentiary hearing because such factual disputes as existed
would not require setting aside the union's victory even if resolved in the
employer's favor. Regarding the first election objection' 52 that a union campaign brochure containing a portion of an NLRB publication suggested
Board endorsement of the union, the court found no disputed factual issue
143. Id. at 1337.
144. Id. at 1338.
145. A strike to obtain higher wages, better working conditions, or improvements in benefits
is called an economic strike. An unfair labor practice strike is one precipitated or prolonged by
an employer's unfair labor practices. An economic strike may be converted into an unfair labor
practice strike by the intervening commission of an unfair labor practice. Economic strikers are
not entitled to reinstatement if replacements are hired before the strikers unconditionally offer
to return to work; unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to reinstatement regardless of
whether replacements have been hired. See general/y R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 339-43.
146. 672 F.2d at 1338.
147. Id. at 1339.
148. Id.
149. 659 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1150 (1982).
150. The refusal to bargain was resorted to as a means of contesting alleged election irregularities and the validity of the Board's certification of the union as the bargaining representative
for the employees. See supra note 6. Either party may move, within five days of an election, to

set aside the results on grounds that conduct attributed to the other party prevented a fair
election. These objections are usually resolved by the regional director without an evidentiary
hearing. See generaly J. ATLESON, R. ROBIN, G. SCHATZKI, H. SHERMAN, E. SILVERSTEIN,
LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT 153 (1978). See also Voegler, Employer Objections to the Conduct of NLRB Elections, 4 GLEN-

DALE L.
151.
152.
briefed.

REV. 1 (1982).
659 F.2d at 129.
Of Crown Cork's 60 objections, the court discussed only the four that were actually
Id. at 128.
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and no abuse of discretion in the Board's inference that employees could not
have been misled since union authorship of the brochure was clearly identified. 1 53 The company also argued that the balloting was conducted in such
a manner that the voters' choices could be seen. The court decided this
claim did not warrant a hearing because there was no evidence that voters
54
actually had reason to believe their votes were observable. 1
Crown Cork argued that the union's promise that employees would receive the same benefits as employees at other company plants already covered by a master contract distorted the election results. The court of appeals
refused to analogize this admittedly truthful promise to an employer's improper pre-election promise of benefits if the union is defeated. The court
reasoned that the union, unlike the employer, would have no opportunity to
retaliate if defeated. 155 Likewise, the court declined to set aside the election
on grounds that a union campaign poster materially misrepresented facts
concerning hourly wages payable if the union was certified. The union's
evidence that cost-of-living raises under the master contract would bring
wages to the level stated in the poster was uncontested. Therefore, the court
concluded that the regional director did not abuse his discretion in deter56
mining that the poster was not misleading.'
In Bokum Resources Corp. v. NLRB 15 7 the employer also refused to bargain with the Board certified union and defended against the resulting unfair labor practice charges' 5 8 on the ground of election irregularities. The
court of appeals denied the demand for an evidentiary hearing and summarily disposed of Bokum's other complaints. Bokum's contention that an incomplete election notice frustrated the purpose of the election was dismissed
159
because a complete notice was posted twelve hours before the election.
Furthermore, Bokum failed to establish that the union or its representatives
posted the incomplete election notice. 16 Concerning the company's allegation that campaign literature was misleading because it omitted certain important facts, the court pointed out that the Board does not require
affirmative disclosure in campaign propaganda. 16 1 Finally, no merit was
found in Bokum's assertion that the union violated Board rules 16 2 by discounting membership fees to supporters since this reduction was available to
63
employees both before and after the election.'
The employer in NLRB v. Slagle Manufacturing Co. '64 attacked the valid153. Id. at 130.
154. Id. at 131.
155. Id. at 130.
156. Id. at 130-31.
157. 655 F.2d 1021 (10th Cir. 1981).
158. The employer was charged with violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(5) (1976). See
supra note 7.
159. 655 F.2d at 1024.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973) (union's offer to waive initiation fees
for all employees who signed union authorization cards before certification election interfered
with employees' statutory right to refrain from union activities).
163. 655 F.2d at 1024.
164. 658 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1981).
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ity of an election on the basis of two theories of misconduct. First, the company alleged violation of the strict rule of Mlchem, Inc. 165 prohibiting
prolonged conversations between employees waiting to vote and representatives of parties to an election. The court found ample support for the
Board's determination that Gann, the individual accused of misconduct, did
not become a representative of the union merely by attending a pre-election
conference and inspecting the polling area prior to the election.' 66 Second,
the company argued that even if Gann was not a union representative, his
presence and conduct disrupted the election because of the pending charge
that Gann's recent dismissal was an unfair labor practice.' 6 7 Acknowledging that Gann's presence at the election carried the potential for affecting
voter choice, the Tenth Circuit court nevertheless concluded that his conduct was not so clearly disruptive as to outweigh his right to be present at
and vote in the election.' 68 The court, therefore, refused to set aside the
election.
In an unpublished opinion, A.S Homer, Inc. v. NLRB,' 69 the court considered issues of alleged election campaign misrepresentations and denial of
due process by the Board's refusal to hear certain post-election objections.
Horner maintained that its failure prior to the election to request review of
both the bargaining unit determination and voter eligibility formula did not
amount to a waiver. Furthermore, the company claimed the Board's failure
to consider its objections constituted a denial of due process. The court of
appeals recognized the harshness of the waiver rule, but found it consistent
with the Board's legitimate need to prevent prolonged post-election bargaining delays. The court, therefore, declared that the Board's refusal to con1 70
sider Homer's objections did not amount to a denial of due process.
Concerning the misrepresentation issue, the company claimed that a new
election was warranted because the union misled employees into believing
they would be allowed to join other craft unions. 171 The court affirmed the
Board's ruling that the union's representations did not substantially misrepresent Board processes 172 and that they also did not have a material impact
73
on the election.'
165.

170 N.L.R.B. 362 (1968).

166. 658 F.2d at 787.
167. Id. at 786.
168. Id. at 787.
169. No. 79-2185 (10th Cir. May 26, 1982), cert. denid, 51 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1983) (No. 82-696).
170. No. 79-2185, slip op. at 6-8.
171. Id. at II.
172. Id. at 15. The regional director applied the standard of review announced in Shopping
Kart Food Mkts., Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977) (an election would not be set aside unless the
misrepresentation involved the Board or its processes).
173. No. 79-2185, slip op. at 15. Subsequent to the regional director's decision, the Board
announced in General Knit of Calif., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978), the abandonment of the
Shopping Kart standard and the reinstatement of the standard set forth in Hollywood Ceramics
Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). In Holywood Ceramics the Board held that elections would be set
aside where the misrepresentation had an impact on the election, the employees lacked knowledge to make their own determination, and there was no opportunity for rebuttal. See generally
R. GORMAN, supra note 6, at 156. This vacillation in the Board's policy created a plethora of
law review articles. Eg., Cole, Misrepresenlations in Union Eletlion Camnpains-What is the
NL.R.B. 's Rule. Hollywood Ceramics or Shopping Kart?, 40 ALA. LAw. 414 (1979); Note, Gen-
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Enforcement of Collective BargainingAgreements

The issue involved in Trustees of Teamsters Construction Workers Local No. 13
v. Hawg N Action, Inc. 174 was whether the employer breached its contract
with the union by failing to make contributions to various trust funds in
connection with its use of independent contractors and subcontractors.
Hawg N Action admitted that its subcontracts did not require the subcontractor to make contributions to the trust funds as provided in its agreement
with the union. Hawg N Action, however, argued that it did not agree with
75
the union to make such contributions if the subcontractor failed to do so.'
The court of appeals dismissed this argument reasoning that acceptance of
the argument would deny the trustees a remedy for an undisputed breach of
contract.' 76 Further, the employer could not avoid liability merely because
the trust fund payments would not actually benefit the subcontractor's
77
employees. 1
The company leased equipment, which was operated by the lessor, to
perform part of its work. In an attempt to circumvent liability under the
agreement, the company characterized these lessors as independent contractors. The court, however, failed to find such characterization determinative
under the terms of the agreement 178 and rejected this defense.' 79 The employer's final argument was that it had repudiated the agreement by ceasing
to make payments for its own employees and that recovery was therefore
barred on the grounds of estoppel and laches. This claim was not resolved
by the Tenth Circuit court because the employer raised it for the first time
on appeal. Nevertheless, the court was careful to note that such disposition
did not indicate any merit in the argument. 8 0
In United Food Workers Internationalv. Gold Star Sausage Co. ,181 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an arbitrator's award in an enforcement
action under section 301 of the NLRA. 18 2 The grievance submitted to arbitration as provided in the collective bargaining agreement arose after an employee was summarily discharged for violating the company's unilaterally
promulgated no-fighting rule.183 Arbitrator Linn decided that the terminaeral Knit Revives Hollywood Ceramics; The NLRB Again Aohibits Campaign Misrepresentations, 7
PEPPERDINE L. REv. 185 (1979); Comment, The Hollywood Ceramics-Shopping Kart Meryy-Go-

Round- Where Willt Stop?, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 157 (1980).
174. 651 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982).
175. 651 F.2d at 1387.
176. Id.
177. Id. Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 (1977), held that such payments could be based on
the hours worked by the subcontractor's employees and need not be for the benefit of such
employees.
178. 651 F.2d at 1389. Article 25 of the agreement between the defendant company and the
union, in pertinent part, states: "When a Contractor [defendant company] rents or leases from
one Owner not more than two units of equipment, fully manned and operated . . . the following shall apply . . . [tihe Contractor shall pay all applicable contributions .
Id.
179. Id. at 1388.
180. Id.
181. No. 80-1479 (10th Cir. July 13, 1981).
182. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) provides, in pertinent part, that suits for breach of contract
between an employer and a union may be brought in any district court having jurisdiction of
the parties, without regard to the amount in controversy.
183. No. 80-1479, slip op. at 2.
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tion violated an implied provision of the contract requiring just cause for
discharge. Linn reasoned that since the employee fought only in self-defense,
she was not at fault. A rule that punishes an employee who is not guilty of
misconduct cannot be said to be necessary for the conduct of the employer's
business. 1 84 Under this reasoning, the rule was invalid under the agreement
and the discharge was without just cause. Consequently, the arbitrator
awarded reinstatement with back pay.
On appeal, Gold Star argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority
by finding an implied just cause provision in the contract.1 85 The Tenth
Circuit court disagreed with the company, emphasizing that courts are reluctant to interfere with an arbitrator's decision where the contract contains
a broad arbitration provision. The court of appeals also found that an arbitrator is clearly permitted to go beyond the express provisions of the collective bargaining agreement and rely on the "industrial common law," so long
as the award is not antagonistic to the express language of the agreement
8 6
and has rational support.1
In another action arising under section 301 of the NLRA,187 New Mexico
District Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co. ,188 both parties appealed the district court's decision that the employer had breached the collective bargaining agreement and that damages should be limited to those amounts payable
directly to the union. The company claimed the agreement was invalid because the union had not represented a majority of employees when the
agreement was signed. The Tenth Circuit court rejected this defense because the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction to hear unfair labor practice
charges.' 8 9 Thus, this defense did not constitute a ground on which the
9°
court could find an agreement unenforceable in a section 301 action.'
The union objected to the trial court's holding that damages should not
include wages due the employee covered by the agreement because such
amounts are not paid directly to the union. The appellate court found merit
in this objection. Citing UAWv. Hoosier CardinalCorp. ,19' the Mayhew court
ruled that a union may recover wages and vacation pay due its members
192
under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
The court of appeals also addressed, in dicta, the issue of whether
"prehire" agreements with a union, permitted under section 8(f) of the
Act,' 9 3 can be enforced against the employer before the union has actually
184. Id. at 5.
185. Id. at 3.
186. Id. at 4.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976); see supra note 182.
188. 664 F.2d 215 (10th Cir. 1981).
189. Id. at 217. The recognition of a minority union constitutes a violation of § 158(a)(1),
(2) by the employer and § 158(b)(1) by the union. International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
190. 664 F.2d at 217.
191. 383 U.S. 696, 699 (1966).
192. 664 F.2d at 218-19.
193. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1976) allows employers engaged primarily in the building and con-

struction industry to make an agreement with a labor organization before its majority status has
been established. See generaly Gaal, Pre-Hire Agreements and Their Current Legal Status, 32 SYRACUSE L. REV. 581 (1982); Note, Prehire Agreements in the Construction Industq." Empty Promises or
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established majority status in the bargaining unit. Mayhew contended that
the agreement was covered by section 8(o and could not be enforced against
it because of the ruling in NLRB v. Local 103, InternationalAssociation of Bridge
Workers (Higdon) .194 In Higdon, the Supreme Court held that a union may
not picket to enforce a prehire agreement when it does not represent a majority of the employees.' 95 The Tenth Circuit court, following Contractors
Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co. ,196 distinguished Htgdon and
observed that an "employer who subjects himself to a § 8(o agreement reaps
the benefits of industrial peace at his worksite and should not complain
when he is asked to honor the agreement that made such benefits
97
possible." '
II.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

The question before the court in Marshall v. Regis Educational Corp. 198
was whether student resident-hall assistants at Regis College were "employees" within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). 99
The student assistants resided in the dormitory where they assisted the residence director by performing various administrative tasks, maintaining discipline and order, and encouraging involvement in campus activities. They
were required to maintain a certain grade point average to retain their position and received compensation in the form of reduced room rates and a
tuition credit. The Secretary of Labor, relying on Walling v. PortlandTerminal
Co. ,200 urged that these resident assistants were employees under the FLSA
because of the "immediate economic impact" their services had on the busi20 1
ness of the college.
The Tenth Circuit court endorsed the district court's preference for the
"economic reality" test set forth in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb,202 a case
decided subsequent to Portland Terminal. McComb held that employee status
under the FLSA should depend upon the totality of circumstances, not on
isolated factors. 20 3 The court in Regis stated that the government's view
failed to consider the totality of the circumstances and, in particular, ignored
the educational objectives of the resident assistant program. 20 4 These educational benefits were found to outweigh the mere fact that the college received
Enforceable Righs?, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1702 (1981); Note, Pre-Hire Agreements and Section 80 of
the NLRA. Striking a Proper Balance Between Employee Freedom of Choice and Construction Industiy Stability, 50 FORDHAM L. REv. 1014 (1982).
194. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).

195. 664 F.2d at 219 (citing NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S.
335, 349 (1978)).

196. 638 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1981) (benefit provisions of the prehire agreement could be
enforced despite the labor organization's lack of majority status).
197. 664 F.2d at 220.
198. 666 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1981).
199. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
200. 330 U.S. 148 (1947) (railroad trainees were not employees under the FLSA because the
railroad company received no "immediate advantage" from any work done by the trainees).
201. 666 F.2d at 1327.
202. 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
203. Id. at 730, cited with approval in Regis, 666 F.2d at 1326-27.
204. Id. at 1327.
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some economic value from the program.2 °5 Finally, the court of appeals
dismissed, as an unreasonable alternative, the government's argument that
these services could have been provided by non-student 20 6 and concluded
that the resident assistants should be treated the same as athletes and other
207
financial aid recipients.
Marshall o. Quzk- Tnp Corp.208 primarily addressed the issue of whether
an employer, under an obligation to pay back wages for FLSA violations,
may retain those wages offered but refused by the employees. An investigation of Quik-Trip's wage practices led to a settlement agreement in which
the company promised to pay back wages for overtime worked by certain
employees. Six of the employees either tore up or refused to cash their back
pay checks, under allegedly coercive circumstances. 20 9 The Tenth Circuit
court found support 2 10 for the Secretary of Labor's position that regardless
of whether the employees refused the payments voluntarily or involuntarily,
the company had not satisfied its statutory obligation to pay the back
wages. 2 t ' The court stressed that the purpose of the FLSA would be nullified if employers were permitted to retain back wages that were refused by
employees. 2 t 2 Such sums should be deposited with the United States Treas2 13
urer to be retained subject to claims of the employees.
The payment of back wages for overtime work was also an issue in Selman v. Chaval Upholstery Supply Co. .214 This was an interesting case in which
the trial court found no FLSA violation because the employee's gross weekly
wage exceeded minimum wage plus time and a half minimum wage for the
overtime hours worked. Selman asserted section 7 of the FLSA 215 was violated when he was not paid overtime compensation for working nine hours a
day, five days a week. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that overtime wages were due even though Selman's compensation was above the
minimum wage. 2 16 Relying on Overmight Motor Co. v. Missel,2 17 the court observed that "the statutory requirement for overtime pay is not satisfied
merely because the salary exceeds minimum wage plus time and a half mini' 2 18
mum wage for hours worked over forty per week."
205. Id.
206. Id.

207. Id. at 1328.
208. 672 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1982).

209. Id. at 804. The division manager allegedly applied verbal pressure to some employees
in an attempt to persuade them to tear up their checks. Id.
210. Id. at 807 (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740
(1981)).
211. 672 F.2d at 806.

212. Id. at 807.
213. Id. The court adds a caveat that the funds should be so deposited "unless exceptional
circumstances are demonstrated to the court justifying reversion of the funds to the employer."
Id. at 808. The court found no exceptional circumstances in this case.
214. No. 78-1521 (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 1981).
215. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1976) provides that overtime rates of at least one and one-half
times regular rates must be paid for hours worked in excess of 40 per week.
216. No. 78-1521, slip op. at 3.
217. 316 U.S. 572 (1942) (the FLSA was designed to require payment for overtime at 150%
the regular pay where that pay is above the minimum as well as where the regular pay is at the
minimum).
218. No. 78-1521, slip op. at 3.
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OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

An Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC or
Commission) decision upholding a citation of the employer for violating the
general duty clause 2 19 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA) 2 20 was reviewed in BaroidDivision ofNL Industries v. OSHRC.22 ' Baroid sells drilling mud used in the drilling of oil and gas wells. As part of the
cost of the mud, Baroid also provides the consultation services of an on-site
sales representative known as a "mud man." The citation in question arose
when a mud man was injured at a drilling site by an explosion of gas that
had accumulated near the drilling rig. Baroid argued that the Commission's
decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and that it
222
rested on theories not at issue at the administrative hearing.
The court of appeals tested the validity of the OSHA citation against
rigorous standards 223 for upholding a finding that the general duty clause
has been violated. First, the court concluded that a substantial accumulation of gas around a drilling rig is a hazard since it increases the risk that
employees will be killed or seriously injured. 224 Also, the court found that
such hazard existed at a citable workplace; the injured mud man remained an
employee of the cited employer because he was subject to Baroid's authority
to remove him from the workplace. 225 The Tenth Circuit court also found
Brennan v. Butler Lime and Cement Co. 226 persuasive in its holding that even
where an employer does not control the worksite where a recognized hazard
exists, the employer will remain liable if the employee could feasibly have
227
been trained to avoid the hazard.
Second, the court of appeals found substantial evidence to suppopt the
Commission's finding that the hazards of gas accumulation, fire, and explosion were "recognized hazards," either by the cited employer or generally
within the industry. 228 The implication that the absence of a gas
separator 229 is a recognized hazard, however, was not supported by evidence
2 30
in the record.
219.
hazards
220.
221.
222.
223.

29 U.S.C. § 654 (1976) imposes a general duty on employers to abate recognized
at the job site if they are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees.
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
660 F.2d 439 (10th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 444.
These standards required that:

[Tihe Secretary must show (1)that a hazard likely to cause death or serious bodily
harm existed at a citable workplace; (2) that that hazard was recognized as such either
by the cited employer or generally within the industry; and (3) that there was a feasible method by which the cited employer could have abated the "recognized hazard."

Id. (citations omitted).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 444-45.
226. 520 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1975).

227. 660 F.2d at 445-46. The Seventh Circuit in Butler Lime stated that an employer would
be held liable where the employee's conduct (causing the accident) "might have been precluded
through feasible precautions concerning the hiring, training, and sanctioning of employees."
Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975).

228. 660 F.2d at 446.
229. A gas separator would have vented the gas away from the drilling rig, substantially
reducing the hazard. Id. at 442, 444.

230 Id- at 446.
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Finally, the appellate court found some evidence to support the finding
that Baroid had a feasible means of abating the recognized hazard. The
mud men could possibly have been trained to monitor gas accumulations
and instructed to evacuate if they smelled gas. 23 ' The case was, therefore,
remanded to develop the record on the limited issue of whether it is technologically feasible to train employees to measure hazardous gas accumulation
23 2
levels by sense of smell.
In response to Baroid's contention that it did not receive adequate notice of the theories of recognized hazard and feasible abatement relied upon
by the Commission, the court agreed that "[a]n OSHA citation must give
reasonably particular notice so that the cited employer will understand the
charge being made and will have a full and fair opportunity to prepare and
present a defense. ' ' 233 Nevertheless, since citations are prepared by non-legal
personnel required to act with dispatch, they should not be held to the same
strict standards as other pleadings. 234 The court found that the citation
could reasonably be construed to state that gas accumulation was one of the
recognized hazards present. 235 The court, however, was not persuaded that
Baroid received adequate notice of what abatement steps should have been
taken. This inadequate notice, the court held, was further justification for
236
remanding the case.

IV.

RAILWAY LABOR ACT

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in St. Louis Southwestern Railway v.
Brotherhood of RailroadSignalmen,237 reversed the district court's holding that
the controversy between the railroad and union was a minor dispute suitable
for compulsory arbitration and, therefore, not one over which the union
could lawfully strike. The dispute arose when the railroad contracted out
work because it was unable to hire enough signalmen to complete the rehabilitation of a newly acquired line. The union's threatened strike over the
contracting out was enjoined by the trial court on the grounds that the dispute was a minor one since such contracting out had been permitted during
World War II and because the collective bargaining agreement did not ex238
pressly prohibit such contracting out.
The union argued that the dispute was a major one because contracting
out involved an indirect attempt to introduce an employment practice not
recognized by the agreement or past practices. 239 The Tenth Circuit court
231.

Id. at 447.

232. Id. at 448.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 449.
236. Id. at 450.
237. 665 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2011 (1982).
238. 655 F.2d at 990. A minor dispute is one which involves either the meaning or application of a particular provision of an agreement and, therefore, the issue is whether an existing
agreement controls the controversy. If minor, the controversy must be submitted to compulsory
arbitration and a strike over the issue is unlawful. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago
River & I.R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 30, 35-39 (1957).
239. 665 F.2d at 990. A major dispute involves an attempt to create new rights by creating
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agreed with the union and found an "almost complete dearth of evidence in
support of the trial court's determination. . . that the case involves a minor
and not a major dispute . ... "240 The court found unjustified the rail-

road's reliance on World War II precedent to establish an implied right to
contract out employment, noting that the union had consistently rejected
the railroad's attempts to include amendments authorizing contracting
24

Out.

1

Further support for the union's position was found in the Railway La3
bor Act (RLA) 242 and a Supreme Court decision. 24 The court concluded

that certain provisions of the RLA244 left no room for contracting out since
contractor's employees would not be able to comply with the statutory requirements.2 45 Citing Detroit & Toledo Shore Line Railroadv.United Transportation Union,2 46 the Tenth Circuit court accepted the union's position that the
railroad's attempt to change the existing contractual obligations by asserting
2 47
an implied right to contract out employment constituted a major dispute.

The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case was remanded
for further proceedings.
V.

FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT

2 48

In Director, Oftce of Workers' Compensation Programsv.Gurule249 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed an order of the Benefits Review Board
(Board) establishing a black lung benefits onset date different from that determined by the Department of Labor's hearing officer. The Board had concluded that benefits for claimant Gurule should begin the month his claim
was filed, not the month medical evidence of total disability was first established. 2 5 On appeal, the Director of the Office of Worker's Compensation
Programs contended that the Board had made the factual determination for
tests to the date of
the benefit onset date by relating back results of medical
25
filing and, therefore, had exceeded its scope of review. '
The Tenth Circuit court determined that the Board had not made a
factual determination in arriving at the onset date, but, instead, had reached
that date by correctly applying the Secretary of Labor's regulations.2 52 Following Begly v. Mathews 253 and Paluso v. Mathews,254 the Board found the
or changing an agreement. Compulsory arbitration is not required and the right to strike remains. Id. See 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1976).
240. 665 F.2d at 998.
241. Id. at 991.
242. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
243. 665 F.2d at 995 (citing Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United Transp.
Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969)).
244. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
245. 665 F.2d at 995.
246. 396 U.S. 142 (1969).
247. 665 F.2d at 998.
248. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-960 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
249. 653 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1981).
250. Id. at 1371.
251. Id. at 1370.
252. Id. at 1372.
denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977) (because black lung
253. 544 F.2d 1345 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
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hearing officer's onset date was not supported by substantial evidence since a
single blood study was insufficient to establish such a date in view of the
latent and progressive nature of the disease. 255 Accordingly, where the date
of total disability cannot be determined, the regulations provide that benefits should begin with the month the claim was filed. 256 After careful review

the court of appeals affirmed the Board's decision stating that "the Board
entangled morass of regulations promulcorrectly and cogently applied the257
gated by the Secretary of Labor.
Mt'chael T Penn'ngton

disease is of a slow and progressive nature, medical evidence subsequent to the cut-off date is
relevant to the determination of whether the miner had the disease as of the cut-off date).
254. 573 F.2d 4 (10th Cir. 1978) (medical evidence obtained after the cut-off date is relevant
in ascertaining when black lung disease commenced, given the progressive nature of the disease
and the difficulty in making accurate diagnosis).
255. 653 F.2d at 1371-72.
256. 20 C.F.R. § 725.503(b) (1982).
257. 653 F.2d at 1372.

